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JOINT ATTENTION, JOINT ACTION, 
AND PARTICIPATORY SENSE MAKING1 
Shaun Gallagher 
Developmentally, joint attention is located at the intersection of a 
complex set of capacities that serve our cognitive, emotional and action-
oriented relations with others. It forms a bridge between primary 
intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthan 1978, 1998; 
Trevarthan and Hubley 1979). Primary intersubjectivity consists in a set of 
sensory-motor abilities that allow us to understand the meaning of another 
persons movements, gestures, facial expressions, eye direction, and 
intentional actions, in the context of face-to-face interactions. These are the 
abilities that we first require in order to enter into joint-attentional 
situations. Once we are in situations of joint attention we are then able to 
further enhance our understanding of others, in secondary intersubjectivity, 
by seeing how they use things and how our shared world forms a context 
for their actions2. 
                                                                          
1. For work on this project I have benefited from research grants at the École normale 
supérieure de Lyon and CNRS while a visiting professor at the ENS in Lyon (2010), and visiting 
researcher at the Centre de recherche en épistémologie appliquée, École polytechnique, Paris 
(2009 and 2010). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Husserl Archives at the 
École normale supérieure in Paris. 
2. The concepts of primary and secondary intersubjectivity were first explicated in 
developmental studies. These are not, however, stages or precursors that we go through and 
that we eventually leave behind (cf. Baron-Cohen 1991). Rather, the various capacities of 
primary and secondary intersubjectivity, including joint attention, continue to characterize our 
adult interactions. That is, as adults, we continue to rely on embodied capabilities that facilitate 
our primary-intersubjective understanding of others through our perception of their postures, 
facial expressions, actions, etc., and our secondary-intersubjective capacities to engage with 
them in highly contextualized situations (see Gallagher 2005; 2008a&b). The interaction theory of 
social cognition, in contrast to theory-of-mind approaches (theory theory or simulation 
theory) adds communicative and narrative competencies to these embodied abilities to explain 





Joint attention contributes to two important aspects of intersubjectivity: 
(1) social cognition, our ability to understand others, what they intend, and 
what their actions mean; and (2) participatory sense-making, our ability to 
understand the world through our interactions with others (De Jaegher and 
Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher, 2010; Gallagher 2009). 
Participatory sense-making (PSM) is, our ability to co-constitute (with 
others) meaning in different contexts and environments. In this paper I 
explore how joint attention contributes to PSM, and how the coordination 
involved in joint attention and joint action involve embodied and distributed 
cognitive processes. 
The question addressed here is whether joint attention is to be 
understood in terms of the coordination of mental states between 
individuals, as the standard theory-of-mind approaches to social cognition 
contend. On these approaches, including both theory theory (TT) and 
simulation theory (ST), the idea is that joint attention involves a kind of 
mindreading that depends on theoretical inference or simulation of the 
other persons mental states. I understand your intentions and what you are 
going to do by understanding your beliefs and desires. The alternative view, 
defended by interaction theory (IT), is that joint attention is based primarily 
on embodied, enactive, and extended interactive processes. That is, the 
coordination involved in joint attention and joint action is primarily one 
constituted by embodied movement, gestures, facial expressions, and 
communicative practices, located in specific contexts. From just such 
interactive situations, we co-constitute the meaning of the other persons 
actions and the world around us. 
Social cognition and participatory sense-making 
The problems of social cognition (how we understand others) and PSM 
(how we understand the surrounding world with or through others) are 
closely related, but they are in fact two different problems (Gallagher 2009). 
These two problems, however, are sometimes confused. Di Paolo and De 
Jaegher (2007), for example, define PSM on the basis of a more basic sense-
making where enactive exchanges with the world are inherently significant. 
Importantly, however, they point out that sense-making happens not merely 
by means of an enactive, embodied movement, but also through coordinated 
interaction with others, and precisely this is participatory sense-making. De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo complain, however, that the concept of PSM is simply 
missing even in embodied accounts of social cognition, and such accounts 
could be improved if they were reoriented to PSM. Their idea, then, is to 
reframe the problem of social cognition as that of how meaning is generated 
                                                                                                                                        
Cultural practices and social roles are also important aspects that support social cognition (see 
Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Ratcliffe 2007). 




and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process 
and the individuals engaged in it (2007, 485). Thus, they are interested in 
how aspects of social interaction affect the way participants understand each 
other, e.g., in dialogue how emotional attributions are influenced by 
temporal delay or are reciprocally constructed (497-98)  and they think of 
this as an example of PSM (also see Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009). 
I have argued that it is much more accurate to say that PSM is a closely 
related, but different problem from the problem of social cognition. PSM 
addresses the issue of how intersubjective interaction enters into meaning 
constitution, and most generally the co-constitution of the meaningful 
world. The question that PSM addresses is: How do we, together, in a social 
process, constitute the meaning of the world? In contrast, the problem of 
social cognition is centered on the following question: How do we 
understand another person?  
One can still say that these two problems are closely related. On the one 
hand, the problem of PSM is the more general problem and may include 
social cognition since if we are trying to make sense out of the world, that 
world includes other people. In this regard understanding others may be 
part of PSM, if in making sense of them we are also engaged interactively 
with them or with others. On the other hand, and in a more primary sense, it 
goes the other way, that is, our understanding of the world is shaped by our 
interactions with, and in our understanding of, other people, how they act in 
the world, how they value or fail to value objects, and so on. There is a 
certain ordering of these problems in the sense that PSM for the most part 
seems to presuppose that I am capable of making sense of the other person 
in our interactions (this is clearest in De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). 
Despite the close relationship between the two problems, its important 
to note their difference. The difference is summarized in terms of their 
respective targets: in the case of PSM, the world (most generally), and in the 
case of social cognition, other agents or persons. Understanding another 
person is quite different from understanding a tool, an object, a worldly 
event, etc. and indeed, even perceiving another person is different from 
perceiving a tool or an object (Gallagher 2008b). Making sense of the world 
together (with another person) is not the same thing as making sense of 
another person within our interactive relationship, even if that interactive 
relationship itself involves PSM. One process may contribute to the other; 
and indeed, both depend on interaction. PSM involves interaction with 
others; the meaning of the world emerges through our interaction together. 
In some sense, to the extent that intersubjective interaction is involved in 
both social cognition and PSM, we have two different questions that have a 
common core to their answer. Perhaps the closeness of these problems 
comes out best in the conceptions of joint attention and secondary 
intersubjectivity where our ability to see and interact with others in our 
everyday dealings with the world  as we use objects, navigate situations, 





and so on. We can think of the capacities gained in joint attention and 
secondary intersubjectivity as contributing to how we can make sense of the 
world together. 
Interaction 
The kind of interaction found in both social cognition and PSM can best 
be explained from an enactive perspective. On the enactive view, as 
embodied agents, we do not passively receive information from our 
environment and then create internal representations of the world; rather, 
we actively participate in the generation of meaning. Thus, our world is not 
a pre-given external realm, it is the result of pragmatic and dynamic 
interchanges between agent and environment (Dewey 1896; Gallagher 1986; 
Thompson 2007; Varela et al. 1991). On this model, social cognition is based 
on social interaction. 
The analyses of social interactions in shared activities, in working together, 
in communicative practices, and so on, show that agents unconsciously 
coordinate their movements, gestures, and speech acts (Issartel et al. 2007; 
Kendon 1990; Lindblom 2007). In communication, as we listen to another 
person, we coordinate our perception-action sequences; our movements are 
coupled with changes in velocity, direction and intonation of the movements 
and utterances of the speaker. Our movements are often synchronized in 
resonance with others, following either in-phase or phase-delayed behavior, 
and in rhythmic co-variation of gestures, facial or vocal expressions (Fuchs 
and De Jaegher 2009). Developmental studies show the very early appearance 
of, and the importance of, this timing and coordination in the intersubjective 
context3. In still face experiments, for example, infants are engaged in a 
normal face-to-face interaction with an adult for 1 to 2 minutes, followed by 
the adult assuming a neutral facial expression. This is followed by another 
normal face-to-face interaction. Infants between 3 and 6 months become 
visibly discouraged and upset during the still face period (Tronick et al. 
1978). The importance of interactive touch has also been demonstrated in the 
still-person effect (Muir 2002). 
Murray and Trevarthen (1985) have also shown the importance of the 
mothers live interaction with 2-month old infants in their double TV 
monitor experiment where mother and infant interact by means of a live 
television link. The infants engage in lively interaction in this situation. 
When presented with a recorded replay of their mothers previous actions, 
however, they quickly disengage and become distracted and upset. These 
results have been replicated, eliminating alternative explanations such as 
                                                                          
3. Indeed, interaction likely predates strictly intersubjective relations and can be traced to 
prenatal motor experience and the non-conscious motor coupling between mother and fetus 
(Lymer 2010). 




infants fatigue or memory problems (Nadel et al. 1999; Stormark and 
Braarud 2004). 
Interaction theory (IT), in contrast to the theory theory (TT) and the 
simulation theory of social cognition (ST) focuses on the emergence of this 
interactive behavior, apparent in early infancy, in processes of primary 
intersubjectivity. The infants understanding of the other person is not a 
form of mindreading or mentalizing that targets the others mental states (as 
argued by TT and ST); it is rather a perceptual and affective grasping of the 
meaning of others behavior as manifested in their movements, postures, 
gestures, facial expressions, vocal intonations, etc. It is based on this 
dynamical process of interaction and dyadic coordination of embodied 
agents coupled to each other in perceptual and emotional ways. 
This kind of interaction involves coordination but does not imply perfect 
synchronisation. Studies show that non-autistic infants from 3 months of age 
prefer slight modulations (time-delays) and imperfect contingency in responses 
(Gergely 2001). As De Jaegher (2008) suggests, continuous movements between 
synchronised, desynchronised and the states in-between, drive the process. 
Attunement, loss of attunement, and re-established attunement maintain 
both differentiation and connection. Importantly, the interaction goes beyond 
each participant; it results in something (the creation of meaning) that goes 
beyond what each individual qua individual can bring to the process. There 
may be just two individuals if there is no interaction; but if two individuals 
interact, there is something more, just as when two people dance the tango, 
something dynamic is created that neither one could create on their own. In 
this regard interaction has a certain kind of autonomy (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007), and neither of the participants are entirely able to completely 
control the interactive process, if it is truly interactive. In cases were one 
person is totally in control of the other person, there is no interaction in this 
specific sense. Indeed, this reflects a basic hermeneutical aspect of interaction  
interpretation of the other person, or of the world with or through the other 
person, always extends beyond the control of the agent, and this is the basis 
of learning (Gallagher 1992). Accordingly, sustained and repeated 
interactions build implicit relational knowledge and improve possibilities 
for greater fluency, flexibility, and further successful interactions (see De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, p. 496). 
That these interactions are embodied, means that they are sensory-motor, 
perceptual, kinaesthetic, and hedonic (see Cole and Montero 2007). 
Movement and perception of movement (in action, but also in gestures, 
vocalizations, facial expressions) play a large role in constituting these 
interactions. In these embodied dimensions, saliency and meaning emerge. 
The intentions of the other person are visible in their movements. Grasping, 
pointing, moving towards, moving away, staying close, nodding, gazing in a 
certain direction, etc.  all of these things occurring in specific styles (Hobson 
in press)  register, often non-consciously, as inherently meaningful. For 





current interest in an object, their facial expression, which may reflect 
specific emotional content, will have an effect on the way I may come to feel 
about that object, and may lead to or discourage subsequent action directed 
towards that object (Bayliss et al. 2006; 2007; Becchio et al. 2007; 2008). 
Interactions also include mutually generated intentional actions and 
responses that lead to a build up of meaningful action chains. One 
intentional movement  e.g., pointing  may motivate movement on the 
others part, moving in a specific direction, reaching, grasping, moving back, 
handing over, taking back, and so on, creating, as Fuchs and De Jaegher 
indicate, a common space of meaning in movement. Note that this kind of 
action chain can also be worked into a narrative structure. This common 
space includes, however, not just the meanings of the other persons actions 
and intentions in primary intersubjectivity; that is, interaction supports not 
just social cognition; it also supports participatory sense-making that makes 
sense out of the world through our engagements with others. This begins 
and is most clearly manifest in the phenomenon of joint attention. 
Joint attention and joint action 
In joint attention, which developmentally begins to emerge around 9 months 
of age (Reddy 2008), I, as an experiencing subject, learn about the world 
through others. When we see another person look at something, or gaze in a 
certain direction, we automatically tend to follow their gaze to the object or 
the location. This is often the initiation of an instance of joint attention, 
which has importance for our ability to generate meaning in participatory 
sense-making. Not only does the direction of another persons gaze indicate 
current interest in an object, their facial expression, which may reflect 
specific emotional content, will have an effect on the way I may come to feel 
about that object, and it may lead to or discourage subsequent action 
(Bayliss et al. 2006; 2007; also Niedenthal et al. 2005; see Gallagher, in press-
b). How I perceive the world, and what saliences I find there, are to some 
extent put in place by the gazes and actions of others. My actions with 
respect to the world, and with respect to others, emerge in the context set by 
those others. Repacholi and Meltzoff (2007; Repacholi, Olsen and Meltzoff 
2006; Repacholi, Meltzoff and Olsen 2008), for example, have shown that the 
emotional expressions of one person while watching the action of another 
(showing anger or a neutral facial expression) will influence an 18-month 
old infants inclination to imitate the actions of the second person (also 
Walden and Ogan 1988). 
The interactive nature of joint attention, with respect to both social 
cognition and participatory sense-making, depends on a certain kind of 
intersubjective coordination. How should we characterize this coordination? 
According to Tomasello (1995), joint attention involves the coordination of 
attention. In joint attention the child coordinates her attention to the object 




and the adult at the same time as the adult coordinates her attention to the 
same object and the child (Tomasello 1995, 107). What exactly does it mean 
to coordinate attention?  One view is that since attention is a psychological 
state, then the coordination must be a psychological coordination. In 
philosophy of mind the notion of psychological coordination is often framed 
in terms of propositional attitudes, or being in certain mental states, like 
belief or desire  states where we mentally recognize something to be the 
case. Moreover, on this view, with respect to joint attention, the object of 
such propositional states is the other persons mental states  i.e., we 
recognize or know that the other person is attending, and the other person 
knows that we are attending. John Campbell summarizes this view. 
There are various ways in which propositional states could be involved in 
coordination. Propositional states might enter into the control of attention itself 
and they might enter into my recognition of how my attention, or your attention, is 
being controlled. First, it might be that I know what you are attending to, and that 
this knowledge is a factor in sustaining my attention on the thing. Secondly, I 
might intend to attend to whatever you are attending to. And thirdly, it might be 
that I know that the reason I am attending to the thing is, in part, that you are 
attending to it. And finally, it might be that I know that the reason you are 
attending to the thing is, in part, that I am attending to it. (Campbell 2005, 245). 
Such accounts are consistent with TT and ST conceptions of mindreading, 
rather than embodied interaction. I not only have to know that you are 
attending, but I have to know that you are capable of having such a mental 
state as attending to something, and that is something I have to infer or 
simulate. Such mindreading, as Campbell points out, is off-line in that its 
upshot is not permanent and it is decoupled from action (242). Decoupled 
from action because TT and ST, as noted, have traditionally been cast in terms 
of third-person observation rather than second-person interaction. 
The fact that joint attention capability develops between 9 months and 
1 year of age is already problematic for TT and explicit versions of ST  that 
is, for any account of social cognition that depends on some kind of complex 
cognition or some additional step of interpretation beyond what is available 
perceptually and contextually. But if it is not theory or simulation that 
provides access to others minds, then what? What is the nature of the 
perceptual and contextual factors that seemingly give us access to the other 
persons mental state of attention? This, however, is just the wrong way to 
frame the question, because once we admit that what is required for joint 
attention is the discernment of mental states that are not accessible and that 
must be inferred or simulated, then joint attention in young infants is 
problematic. 
I have argued elsewhere that the coordination involved in joint attention, 
rather than involving the coordination of mental or psychological states, is 
primarily motoric and affective (Gallagher in press-a&b): joint attention 





and ST, interaction theory suggests that the task is not to access interior 
propositional attitudes, but to perceive intentions and dispositions in the 
embodied behaviors, movements, facial expressions, gestures, and actions of 
others (even if there is an undeniable interior dimension of experience and 
affect associated with these externalities). Joint attention decoupled from 
action, and specifically inter-action, is the rare case (perhaps the case in 
which my connection or coordination with the other person breaks down). 
Consider the following phenomenological example, from Campbell 
(2005). I find myself in a pasture looking at some cattle that start to move 
toward me. As the individual cow moves it seems to be checking that its 
fellow cows are coming along. Campbell seems to suggest that the cows 
themselves are involved in a joint attentional situation. In any case, my own 
response is not to try to get into their minds, or to work out some set of 
propositional attitudes that I attribute to them. Rather, my understanding of 
their joint attention on a particular object (me, in this case) and my own 
attempt to make sense out of what they are doing immediately translates 
into movement on my part. 
Furthermore, if I try to discern whether they are going to change 
direction before they reach me, I dont try to mindread their mental states, I 
try to see it in their movements  or in the movement of the herd as a whole 
 and this in reference to the shape of the field and the possibilities for their 
moving this way or that. My attention to what and where they are attending 
sets my feet in motion. 
If we consider a variation of this setting, I think we can see that the 
attention that I share with other humans involves nothing more than 
something like this. If, for example, my friend and I happen to be in the 
pasture looking at a slow stampede coming towards us, if we catch each 
others eye, as they say, if she grabs my arm and yells and we start to run, is 
there anything more to the coordination that we have to explain? Do I have 
to consider her beliefs and desires? Do I need folk psychology or do I need 
to employ a theory to understand why someone grabs another persons 
arm? Do I need to simulate my friends situation or what she might be 
thinking? No, the kind of knowledge I need is a very practical kind that is 
based on my ongoing perception. Notice that in this example we are 
engaged in both social cognition (I am making sense out of my friends 
behavior) and participatory sense making (together we are jointly attending 
to and making sense out of the cows behavior). 
Perhaps a better example can be found in empirical studies conducted by 
Lindblom (2007; see Lindblom and Ziemke 2007; 2008). In a frame-by-frame 
analysis of video images from episodes of spontaneous social interaction 
captured in situ, Lindblom was able to show the precise dynamics of 
interaction in joint attention during a novel but well-defined task. The task is 
to lift a very young horse (filly) onto her legs. The individual, Bob, who 
initiates the action draws the attention of his two colleagues, not by his vocal 
instructions, but by his movement toward the horse, his hand-claps and 




encouraging words to the horse. There is a large amount of background 
knowledge about horses that enter into the dynamic. The situation at hand 
is obvious, the fact that the filly is unable to rise by herself is obvious, and 
everybody knowing it is not healthy for a horse to lay down for too long 
[leads to the formation of a joint intention to lift the horse] (Lindblom 2007, 
227). They also know that one person on his own cannot lift the filly. Two 
ranch workers come to Bobs aid, and from that point they set about lifting 
the horse with very little vocal communication. Rather bodily actions, facial 
expression, gaze direction, tone of voice, bodily posture, and gesture, 
communicate the specific movement intentions among the group as they 
work. Joint attention is maintained through such bodily and communicative 
movements, and it leads directly to a complex joint action that is guided by 
the continuing movements, postures, gestures, etc. of all three participants. 
Here is the sequence of events. 
At first, Bob is standing next to the filly and begins to bend down at the 
same time as the filly begins an attempt to rise. As Lindblom notes, it is 
difficult to say who is influencing who at this point. The filly might notice 
Bobs downward movement as an intention to help, or Bob might be 
grasping the fillys intention to rise, and for that reason he bends down to 
assist her. Together they create a co-regulated activity with the intention to 
get up (227). 
This first lifting attempt fails and his two colleagues rush over with big 
strides as well as almost in step, but with attention directed toward the 
filly. Bob, who is just beginning another attempt, notices their approach, and 
utters Come on. Together they take up positions for the actual lift. This 
attempt also fails, seemingly because they did not really cooperate with 
each other or did not know exactly how to perform the joint action of lifting, 
and consequently the unregulated interaction, lasting about 5 seconds, 
comes to nothing (229). 
The men then back away to assess the situation. An onlooker suggests a 
strategy of grasping each others hands from underneath the filly. One of the 
men then aligns his bodily position opposite Bob to indicate readiness to try 
the strategy. Bob motions for the onlooker to join them (to provide a partner 
for the third man), indicating where she should locate herself by his 
gestures. 
Bob then demonstrates by way of a lifting gesture: he lowers his upper 
body and hands slightly, and then he continues the whole gesture 
upwards illustrating both the common consensus and how the attempt 
will be made (231). Before Bob lowers his hands, one of the other men who 
has been looking at Bob, starts to make a lifting gesture, which is slightly 
different, as a way of sharing Bobs idea of how to lift, as well as indicating 
that he actually has understood [from his perspective] what to do in the next 
try (232). This gesture combines elements of a first-person perspective, 
lifting his hands as he would in the action  indicating he understands his 





overlapping his hands, representing how his hand will be in relation to 
Bobs hand. 
The following action, with Bob and one co-worker joining hands under 
the midsection of the filly, the other man at the hind quarter, and a fourth 
person joining the group and pulling the horse up from the front, is perfectly 
coordinated and successful. 
This is an example of the human capacity to engage in joint attention, 
joint action, and participatory sense-making. A common intentionality 
emerges among the individuals as they enter into the interaction involved in 
a specific task. This interaction is carried out primarily in spatially and 
temporally coordinated movements that include action-oriented positioning 
and posture, and communicative gesture. To understand how this process 
works, one needs to take the entire group as the unit of analysis. Their 
shared understanding emerges from a set of embodied movements and 
actions in the specific context of what they were doing, and it is irreducible 
to any set of mental states in one individual or even the collection of mental 
states found in all of them. The action, and the meaning of the action, 
transcends any one individual; it is generated in the interaction required for 
the outcome. The joint action, as Lindblom indicates (2007, 237), is a 
distributed and collective phenomenon. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that both social cognition and participatory sense-making, 
in cases of joint attention and joint action, depend primarily on movement  
bodily movement and posture, taking up a relevant position vis a vis the 
other, gestures, facial expressions, vocal intonations, communicative actions, 
and so forth  and not on mindreading abilities that focus on the other 
persons mental states and attentional status. Evidence can be found for this 
interactive approach in an extensive array of developmental studies, in 
phenomenology, and in empirical observations made in the field. 
Shaun Gallagher 
Institute of Simulation and Training 
University of Central Florida 
School of Humanities 
University of Hertfordshire 
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